CVE-2026-31700

Medium

Elevated severity or exploit probability.

CVSS base

7.8 HIGH

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

EPSS — probability of exploitation (30 days)

0.1%

1.3th percentile

CISA KEV

Not listed

Weakness / dates

CWE-362

Published 2026-05-01 · modified 2026-09-08

CVSS breakdown

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Attack Vector	L	Local
Attack Complexity	L	Low
Privileges Required	L	Low
User Interaction	N	None
Scope	U	Unchanged
Confidentiality	H	High
Integrity	H	High
Availability	H	High

Timeline

2026-05-01 — Published (NVD)
2026-09-08 — Last modified (NVD)

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/packet: fix TOCTOU race on mmap'd vnet_hdr in tpacket_snd() In tpacket_snd(), when PACKET_VNET_HDR is enabled, vnet_hdr points directly into the mmap'd TX ring buffer shared with userspace. The kernel validates the header via __packet_snd_vnet_parse() but then re-reads all fields later in virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(). A concurrent userspace thread can modify the vnet_hdr fields between validation and use, bypassing all safety checks. The non-TPACKET path (packet_snd()) already correctly copies vnet_hdr to a stack-local variable. All other vnet_hdr consumers in the kernel (tun.c, tap.c, virtio_net.c) also use stack copies. The TPACKET TX path is the only caller of virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() that reads directly from user-controlled shared memory. Fix this by copying vnet_hdr from the mmap'd ring buffer to a stack-local variable before validation and use, consistent with the approach used in packet_snd() and all other callers.

Affected

linux

References

Official: NVD · CVE.org