PatchRadar

← Browse

CVE-2026-43501

Medium

Elevated severity or exploit probability.

CVSS base
9.8 CRITICAL
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
EPSS — probability of exploitation (30 days)
0.7%
49.7th percentile
CISA KEV
Not listed
Weakness / dates
CWE-131
Published 2026-05-21 · modified 2026-09-08

CVSS breakdown

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Attack VectorNNetwork
Attack ComplexityLLow
Privileges RequiredNNone
User InteractionNNone
ScopeUUnchanged
ConfidentialityHHigh
IntegrityHHigh
AvailabilityHHigh

Timeline

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: rpl: reserve mac_len headroom when recompressed SRH grows ipv6_rpl_srh_rcv() decompresses an RFC 6554 Source Routing Header, swaps the next segment into ipv6_hdr->daddr, recompresses, then pulls the old header and pushes the new one plus the IPv6 header back. The recompressed header can be larger than the received one when the swap reduces the common-prefix length the segments share with daddr (CmprI=0, CmprE>0, seg[0][0] != daddr[0] gives the maximum +8 bytes). pskb_expand_head() was gated on segments_left == 0, so on earlier segments the push consumed unchecked headroom. Once skb_push() leaves fewer than skb->mac_len bytes in front of data, skb_mac_header_rebuild()'s call to: skb_set_mac_header(skb, -skb->mac_len); will store (data - head) - mac_len into the u16 mac_header field, which wraps to ~65530, and the following memmove() writes mac_len bytes ~64KiB past skb->head. A single AF_INET6/SOCK_RAW/IPV6_HDRINCL packet over lo with a two segment type-3 SRH (CmprI=0, CmprE=15) reaches headroom 8 after one pass; KASAN reports a 14-byte OOB write in ipv6_rthdr_rcv. Fix this by expanding the head whenever the remaining room is less than the push size plus mac_len, and request that much extra so the rebuilt MAC header fits afterwards.

Affected

linux

References

Official: NVD · CVE.org