CVE-2026-64047

Medium

Elevated severity or exploit probability.

CVSS base

9.8 CRITICAL

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

EPSS — probability of exploitation (30 days)

0.5%

42.8th percentile

CISA KEV

Not listed

Weakness / dates

CWE-193

Published 2026-07-19 · modified 2026-09-02

CVSS breakdown

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Attack Vector	N	Network
Attack Complexity	L	Low
Privileges Required	N	None
User Interaction	N	None
Scope	U	Unchanged
Confidentiality	H	High
Integrity	H	High
Availability	H	High

Timeline

2026-07-19 — Published (NVD)
2026-09-02 — Last modified (NVD)

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: tls: fix off-by-one in sg_chain entry count for wrapped sk_msg ring When an sk_msg scatterlist ring wraps (sg.end < sg.start), tls_push_record() chains the tail portion of the ring to the head using sg_chain(). An extra entry in the sg array is reserved for this: struct sk_msg_sg { [...] /* The extra two elements: * 1) used for chaining the front and sections when the list becomes * partitioned (e.g. end < start). The crypto APIs require the * chaining; * 2) to chain tailer SG entries after the message. */ struct scatterlist data[MAX_MSG_FRAGS + 2]; The current code uses MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 1 as the ring size: sg_chain(&msg_pl->sg.data[msg_pl->sg.start], MAX_SKB_FRAGS - msg_pl->sg.start + 1, msg_pl->sg.data); This places the chain pointer at sg_chain(data[start], (MAX_SKB_FRAGS - msg_start + 1) .. = &data[start] + (MAX_SKB_FRAGS - msg_start + 1) - 1 = data[start + (MAX_SKB_FRAGS - start + 1) - 1] = data[MAX_SKB_FRAGS] instead of the true last entry. This is likely due to a "race" of the commit under Fixes landing close to commit 031097d9e079 ("bpf: sk_msg, zap ingress queue on psock down") Convert to ARRAY_SIZE and drop the data[start] / - start (as suggested by Sabrina).

Affected

linux

References

Official: NVD · CVE.org